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I. Introduction
On the outset, it is to be noted that this paper deals solely with the
developments in Malaysian family law concerning non-Muslims. In
the past decade, there have been encouraging forward, as well as
unfortunate retrogressive, movements in the sphere of family law in
Malaysia. The aim of this paper is to examine some of the important
changes and highlight some trends from the year 1997.
II. Amendment to the Distribution Act 19581
In a situation where a person dies without leaving a will (dying
intestate), his or her estate will be distributed in accordance with the
Distribution Act 1958. This Act was amended in 1997 via Act Al 0041
97. Amendments were made to ss 3 and 6.
The amendment to s 6 could be described as a significant one.
This is because prior to the amendment, s 6 provided that when a
woman died intestate leaving a husband and children, her husband took
the whole of her estate. This was based on the presumption that the
children's father was the best person to take care of their future and
their interests. This resulted in a lot of problems when widowed
husbands deserted children of the marriage, especially upon remarriage .
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On the other hand, according to the same section, if the husband died,
the wife only took either 113or 112of his estate, depending on whether
they had children. If the husband had more than one wife, all the
wives would have to share equally.
As a result of the above inequality, Parliament finally amended
s 6 in 1997. Under the new s 6(1), the property or the proceeds of
an intestate deceased is distributed as follows:
(i) if an intestate dies leaving a spouse and no issue and no parent
or parents, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to the whole
of the estate;
(ii) if an intestate dies leaving no issue but a spouse and a parent
or parents, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to one half of
the estate and the parent or parents shall be entitled to the
remaining one half;
(iii) if an intestate dies leaving issue but no spouse and no parent
or parents, the surviving issue shall be entitled to the whole of
the estate;
(iv) if an intestate dies leaving no spouse and no issue but a parent
or parents, the surviving parent or parents shall be entitled to
the whole of the estate;
(v) if an intestate dies leaving a spouse and issue but no parent
or parents, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to one-third
of the estate and the issue the remaining two-thirds;
(vi) if an intestate dies leaving no spouse but issue and a parent
or parents, the surviving issue shall be entitled to two-thirds of
the estate and the parent or parents the remaining one-third;
(vii) if an intestate dies leaving a spouse, issue and parent or parents,
the surviving spouse shall be entitled to one-quarter of the
estate, the issue shall be entitled to one-half of the estate and
the parent or parents the remaining one-quarter.
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Therefore, the amendment to s 6 seems to be more equitable
and less discriminatory. Subsequently, Article 8(2) of the Federal
Constitution was amended to include "gender" as an additional ground
of non-discrimination.' It is thus submitted that the amendment to s
6 of the Distribution Act is in line with the spirit and intendment of the
constitutional guarantee of equality before the law as provided in Article
8.
However the Distribution Act does not mention about illegitimate
children. Reference will have to be made to s 11 (1) of the Legitimacy
Act 1961,3 which provides that where the mother of an illegitimate
child dies intestate as respects to all or any of her property, and does
not leave any legitimate issue surviving her, the illegitimate child, or if
he is dead his issue, shall be entitled to take any interest therein to
which he or his issue would have been entitled if he had been born
legitimate. Hence an illegitimate child's right to his mother's property
is limited as he would only be entitled to her property if she (the
mother) does not have any legitimate issue surviving her. It would be
advisable for the mother to provide for such illegitimate child in a valid
will.
III. Equality of Parental Rights under the Guardianship of
Infants (Amendment) Act 1999
Since the 1960s, there has been a long struggle by many groups,
especially the women's group, for the Guardianship of Infants Act
1961 (Revised 1988) (hereafter referred to as "GIA")4 to be amended
2 Article 8(2) provides as follows: "Except as expressly authorised by this
Constitution, there shall be no discrimination against citizens on the ground
only of religion, race, descent, place of birth or gender in any law or in the
appointment to any office or employment under a public authority or in the
administration of any law relating to the acquisition, holding or disposition
of property or the establishing or carrying on of any trade, business,
profession, vocation or employment".
J Act 60.
4 Act 351.
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in order to give women equal parental rights, making them legal
guardians of their children. However, the GIA was only amended in
1999. The controversial provision in the GIA was s 5, which provided
in no uncertain terms that:
The father of an infant shall be the guardian of an infant's
person and property.
The above provision resulted in various problems, one of them
being young girls and boys being deprived of the freedom of movement,
ie traveling abroad, as their mothers, who are either divorced or deserted
by their husbands, were unable to apply for passports for them. Although
the GIA is just under 45 years old, it could be described as a "doddering
dinosaur" in its ideas. This dinosaur has finally become extinct as of
I October 1999, much to the relief of those who have over the years
lobbied for such a change.
"Guardianship" should not be confused with "custody". A
guardian is one who has powers over a child's upbringing, care, discipline
and religion. "Custody" refers to the state of having certain rights
over a child, which rights may include care and control of the child.
A parent may be granted custody of a child whilst the other parent
may be granted its care and control.'
In Dipper v Dipper," Ormrod LJ remarked that it was a
misunderstanding that a parent having custody has the right to control
the children's education. Neither parent had any pre-emptive right
over the other. If there was a disagreement as to the education of
the children, or their religious upbringing, or any other major matter in
their lives, that disagreement had to be decided by the court. His
Lordship said:"
5 Mimi Kamariah Majid, Family Law in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Malayan
Law Journal, 1999) at p 252.
6 [1980J 2 All ER 722.
7 Id at p 731.
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In day-to-day matters the parent with custody is naturally
in control. To suggest that a parent with custody dominates
the situation so far as education or any other serious matter
is concerned is quite wrong.
Thus, the decision in the above case denotes that custody
need not include care and control. Section 4 of the GIA further
explains the duties of a guardian of the property of the infant. He has
the control and management of the infant's property and has to deal
therewith as carefully as a man of ordinary prudence would deal with
his own property. He may, subject to the GIA, do all acts which are
reasonable and proper for the realization or protection of the infant's
property.
The courts usually give the custody of the child to the mother.
This is as a result of s 88(3) of the Law Reform (Marriage and
Divorce) Act 1976 (hereafter referred to as "LRA"),8 which provides
that there shall be a rebuttable presumption that it is for the good of
a child below the age of seven years to be with his or her mother, but
in deciding whether that presumption applies to the facts of any
particular case, the court shall have regard to the undesirability of
disturbing the life of the child by the change of custody."
However, while the mother generally has physical custody and
care of the child, the rights and responsibility of guardianship are with
the father. 10 This means that not only has the father to pay maintenance,
but he also has the ultimate say in virtually every major decision
pertaining to the child. The mother would have to carry out those
8 Act 164
9 Refer to Manickam v Intheranee [1985] 1 MLJ 56; Re Thain [1926] Ch 676;
and Gol! Kim Hwa v Khor Swee Huah [1986] 2 MLJ 156.
10 The GIA however complicates matters by providing in s 3 that the guardian
of an infant shall, inter alia. have the custody of the infant. Thus, it is
suggested that s 3 of the GIA be amended to exclude the words "the custody
of the infant", so that a guardian'S duties are confined to the support,
health and education of the infant. It would perhaps be better to confine
custodial matters to the provisions in the LRA.
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decisions. An inconvenience that can be mentioned as an example of
this unfair position is the application for a passport for the child. The
father must show up at the Immigration Department and in cases of
acrimonious separations, it may not be easy to get the father to do this.
He may have even disappeared altogether.
Thus, to overcome these problems, the amendments should be
fundamental in nature, and should relook at provisions like the one
which makes the mother guardian if the father is dead but at the same
time allows the court to appoint another person as a joint guardian.
Prior to the amendment, it was extremely difficult for the mother to
apply for guardianship rights. The GIA required the existing guardian,
ie the father, to be first removed. "To remove" implies that a strong
case and exceptional circumstances must be made out. This is
extremely difficult unless the father is not interested in guardianship at
all.
As a result of the complaints received from women who were
directly affected, as well as concerns voiced by non-governmental
organisations, particularly women's organisations, the Guardianship of
Infants (Amendment) Act 1999 was finally passed.' This amendment
came into force on 1 October 1999. The new s 5 reads as follows:
(1) In relation to the custody or upbringing of an infant or
the administration of any property belonging to or held
in trust for an infant or the application of the income
of any such property, a mother shall have the same
rights and authority as the law allows to a father, and
the rights and authority of the mother and father shall
be equal.
(2) The mother of an infant shall have the like powers of
applying to the court in respect of any matter affecting
the infant as are possessed by the father.
The abovementioned amendments are timely in view of the
high numbers of women who are joint breadwinners of the family and
who play crucial roles in bringing up their children. The equality in
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parental rights will be of particular use when the father is absent from
the family. It is a great relief to single mothers, as it will enable them
to apply for birth certificates and passports for their children. II
However, if the court allows the mother to be a joint guardian,
initial complexities may arise. For instance, the issue of religion, which
is a highly sensitive issue in a multi-religion state. A child follows the
religion of his or her father. However, where the mother professes
a different religion and is a joint guardian, she might want to teach the
child her religion. This might end in an unhappy situation of the child
observing one religion when with his mother and another when with
his father. This problem could be solved by giving the court powers
to decide whose religion the child should be brought up with if the
situation warrants it. For instance, if the child is already a teenager
and has always followed his father's religion, it might be better to
allow him to continue so.
This above issue was raised in Shama/a Sathiyaseelan v Dr
Jeyaganesh C Mogarajah." The plaintiff wife and the defendant
husband were both Hindus at the time of their marriage. There were
two children of the marriage aged two years and four years respectively.
The defendant husband converted to the Islamic faith in 2002 and the
two children were converted by the defendant husband alone. The
court took note of the equality of parental rights under s 5 of the GIA.
Section 5 provides that the mother of an infant shall have the like
powers of applying to the court in respect of any matter affecting the
infant as are possessed by the father. Additionally, in relation to the
custody and upbringing of an infant, a mother shall have the same
rights and authority as the law allows to a father, and the rights and
authority of the mother and father shall be equal. In this case, the
children were still infants under the GIA.
II See Form 1M 42-Pin 1/97 issued by the Immigration Department for passport
applications. This form, in Part E (Declaration), clearly provides that a mother
could be one of the parties allowed to apply for a passport for a child below
the age of 18 years.
12 [2004] I CU 505 (HC).
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However, the High Court in the above case also referred to
Article 12(4) of the Federal Constitution, which provides that the religion
of a person below the age of 18 shall be decided by his parent or
guardian, and to s 95(b) of the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal
Territories) Act 1993 (Act 505), whereby the phrase used is "his
parent or guardian consents". Both the above provisions have used
the singular word "parent". The consent of a single parent was
enough to validate the conversion of a minor to Islam. Further, s 5
of the GIA did not apply to the defendant husband here as he was
now a Muslim." The court therefore dismissed the plaintiffs application
and held that only the Syariah Court had the competency and the
expertise to determine the issue of conversion here.
One issue that was not addressed by the amendment was
whether the GIA applied to illegitimate children. This is because the
definition of a "child" means a legitimate child in English law, unless
specifically stated to include illegitimate children. This issue was
addressed in Sinnakaruppi alp Periakaruppan v Bathumalai all
Krishnan:" The plaintiff, who was the natural mother of an illegitimate
infant, applied to the court for a declaration that she was the lawful
guardian and was therefore entitled to the custody and care of her
child. A preliminary objection was raised as to the court's jurisdiction
to entertain this application under the GIA. The defendant suggested
that the plaintiff should have proceeded by wardship proceedings. The
learned judge held that the courts were not unanimous in holding
whether the GIA was applicable to illegitimate children and that the
mother seeking custody should do so by way of wardship proceedings.
The preponderant view, however, was that s 24 of the Courts of
Judicature Act 196415 had conferred jurisdiction to the courts to grant
custody and guardianship of both legitimate and illegitimate infants,
regardless of the GIA. Jeffrey Tan J stated: 16
11 Section 1(3) of the G IA. inter alia. states: "Nothing in this Act shall apply
in any State to persons professing the religion of Islam until this Act has
been adopted by a law made by the Legislature of that State ..;"
14 [2001] 6 MLJ 29.
I' Act 91.
16 Supra n 14 at p 34.
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Indeed in the light of the latest amendment to the Guardianship of
Infants Act (see Guardianship of Infants (Amendment) Act 1999
effective I October 1999), and the substitution of the former s 5 by
an altogether new s 5 providing for equality of parental rights, there
is less reason to doubt that the GIA in the present form does not
apply to illegitimate children.
IV. Enactment of the Child Act 2001
The Child Act 200117 is a welcomed piece of legislation as it is an
important step forward in creating a more humane, peaceful and
progressive society. This Act repealed three other statutes" and
consolidated the laws relating to the care, protection and rehabilitation
of children. 19
A comparison will now be made between relevant legislative
provisions relating to family law and the relevant provisions in the
Child Act to examine if the latter has strengthened the laws on the
protection of children and in safeguarding their interests. The matters
that would be examined are custody, adoption, maintenance and the
establishment of a Court for Children.
A. Custody of a child
Although the Child Act does not expressly provide for guardianship or
custodial rights or loss of such rights, this can be inferred from certain
sections in Part V of the Act. Section 18 provides for the taking of
a child in need of care and prorection" into temporary custody by any
Protector" or police officer.
17Act611.
18The Juvenile Courts Act 1947, the Women and Girls Protection Act 1973
and the Child Protection Act 1991.
19Section 130 and the Preamble of Act 611.
ro See s 17 of the Child Act as to the meaning of a "child in need of care
and protection".
~I "Protector" is defined in section 2 of the Child Act as:
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Section 19(1) provides that a child who is taken into temporary
custody shall be produced before the Court For Children within 24
hours. Sub-section (2) provides that if it is not possible to produce the
children before the Court for Children within the time specified, the
child shall be brought before a Magistrate who may direct that the
child be placed in a place of safety or in the care of a fit and proper
person until such time as the child can be produced before the court.
Once the child is placed in a place of safety or in the care of a fit and
proper person, such person shall have control over the child as the
parent of the child would have had, and be responsible for the
maintenance of the child according to s 19(3)(a). Sub-section (3)(b)
further states that notwithstanding that the child is claimed by his
parent or guardian or any other person, the child shall continue in the
care of the person referred to in sub-s (3)(a). Therefore, it can be
assumed that s 19(3) (a) and (b) reflect a temporary loss of
guardianship or custodial rights of a parent or guardian over a child
who is in need of care and protection. The overriding principle of the
best interest of the child is paramount, particularly so in situations
where the child needs care and protection which are not forthcoming
from the parent or guardian or any other person.
When the child is produced before the Court For Children
under s 19 or s 25,22 the court may make an appropriate order according
to s 30(1). For the purposes of this paper, the writer intends to focus
on s 30(1)(b),(d) and (e).
(a) the Director-General;
(b) the Deputy Director-General;
(c) a Divisional Director of Social Welfare, Department of Social
Welfare;
(d) the State Director of Social Welfare of each of the states;
(e) any Social Welfare Officer appointed under s 8.
22 Section 25( 1) provides as follows:
A child who is taken into custody under s 18 and is medically
examined or treated under s 21 shall be brought before a Court
For Children within twenty-four hours -
(a) of the completion of uch examination or treatment; or
(b) if the child is hospitalised, of his discharge from the hospital.
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1. Section 30(1)(b)
Paragraph (b) empowers the court to make an order to place the child
in the custody of a fit and proper person for a period specified by the
court. Therefore, it is up to the court to decide on the period in which
the child should be in the custody of the "fit and proper person". The
question that arises is whether the parent or guardian of the child
would lose his or her guardianship and custodial rights once such an
order is made? It is submitted that the parent or guardian of the child
does not lose the abovementioned rights as paragraph (b) of s 30(1)
provides that the court would specify a period to place the child in the
custody of a fit and proper person. Therefore it could be presumed
that the placement of the child in the custody of a fit and proper
person is merely for a certain period, and therefore suspending the
guardianship or custodial rights of the parent or guardian is only for
that period.
2. Section 30(1)(d)
Paragraph (d) empowers the court to make an order placing a child
in a place of safety for three years from the date of the order or until
he reaches 18 years, whichever is shorter. The issue that arises again
is whether the parent or guardian of the child loses his or her
guardianship or custodial rights during this three year period?
At this juncture, reference may be made to s 10 of the GlA, 2]
which empowers the court or a judge to remove a guardian from his
guardianship, whether a parent or otherwise, and may appoint from
time to time another person to be the guardian in his place. This
section clearly states that the court may remove the guardian and
appoint someone else. However the GIA does not expressly provide
the grounds for such a removal. If a comparison is made between s
10 of the GIA and s 30 (l)(b) and (d) of the Child Act, it is observed
that the latter merely gives the court the power to place the child in
2J Supra n 4.
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the custody of someone else without stating whether the parent or
guardian would lose their guardianship or custodial rights. It would be
interesting to see how the courts would interpret s 30(1) in respect of
guardianship and custodial rights." It is once again submitted that it
is a mere suspension of those rights in the circumstances.
3. Section 30(J)(e)
Section 30(1)(e) provides for placing a child, who has been abandoned
by his parent or guardian, in the care, custody and control of a foster
parent for two years or until he reaches 18 years, whichever is shorter.
In such a case, the Act clearly indicates in s 30(4) that the parent or
guardian of the child may still claim the child, thereby suggesting that
they have not lost their guardianship or custodial rights. In the event
that no such claim is made, the court may make an order placing the
child for adoption by the foster parent or any person who wishes to
adopt the child" and dispense with the consent of the parent or guardian
for the adoption.
A provision in the GIA which is similar to s 30(1)(e) of the
Child Act is s 8A. Section 8A stipulates that:
(1) If an infant -
(a) has been abandoned by his parent or guardian; or
(b) has no parent or guardian,
and no other suitable person is willing and able to care for
him, the Court -
(aa) shall appoint a Protector to be a temporary guard
ian of the infant's person and property or either of
them until such time as a guardian of the infant's
person and property can be appointed;
(bb) shall determine the extent of the powers and duties
of the Protector as a temporary guardian in relation
to the infant's person and property; and
24 Refer also to s 30(8) where the parent or guardian is still allowed to
visit the child.
2~ Having satisfied the conditions in s 30(4)(a) and (b).
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(cc) may impose such other terms and conditions as
having regard to the welfare of the infant, the Court
thinks fit.
(2) Subsection (1) shall apply whether or not an infant is
placed -
(a) in a place of safety; or
(b) in the care, custody and control of a foster parent,
pursuant to any law relating to the care and
protection of an infant.
As "pursuant to any law relating to the care and protection of
an infant" in sub-s (2) above would now include the Child Act, s 8A
of the GIA would apply in addition to s 30(1)(e) of the Child Act.
Section 30(5) of the Child Act states that in deciding a case,
the court shall take into account the best interests of the child as the
paramount consideration. As such, what is the criterion that decides
the "best interests of the child"? The answer to this perhaps could be
seen in s 30(6)(a) which lists the matters the court would look into in
deciding what the best interest of the child would be, ie family
background, general conduct, home surrounding, school record and
medical history of a child. The GIA too has a similar provision.
Section 11 of the GIA states that the court or judge in exercising the
powers conferred by the Act shall have regard primarily to the welfare
of the infant. This section was discussed in the case of Re Satpal
Singh. An Infant" where the child's father applied for custody.
Buttrose J stated that the court must consider the welfare of the child
as a whole. It is more than merely the question of whether the child
would be happier in one place compared to another place. It is the
child's general well being which should be the main criterion. "Welfare"
means physical as well as moral welfare.
26 [1958] MLJ 283.
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Section 30(5) and (6) of the Child Act may also be compared
to s 88(2) of the LRA27 which provides that when deciding in whose
custody the child should be placed, the court shall consider the welfare
of the child as the paramount consideration.
B. Adoption
The provisions on the adoption of a child in the Child Act could be
compared with the Adoption Act 195228 in the following respects.
1. Parents' consent to adoption
The Child Act allows the Court For Children to make an order
placing the child for adoption by the foster parent or any
person who wishes to adopt the child if the parent or guardian
has not claimed the child. Section 30(1)(e) and (4) state that
in making such an order, if the court is satisfied that the
Protector has taken reasonable steps to trace the parent or
guardian of the child, it shall dispense with the parent's or
guardian's consent for the adoption (which is generally
required). This is similar to the consent to adoptions provision
in s 5(l)(a) and (c) of the Adoption Act. A case that may
be referred to in this connection is TPC v ABU where the
court stated:
The burden will be on the proposed adopters to
show that consent ought to be dispensed with.
Where ... it is alleged that the natural mother is
untraceable, the court must insist that all
reasonable steps to trace her have been taken."
27 Supra n 8.
2 Act 257.
2Q [1983] 2 MLJ 79 at p 84.
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2. Role of a Protector
Section 30(6) of the Child Act provides that the Protector is
responsible to investigate the details of the child's background,
prepare a report and submit it to the court before the court
makes an order placing the child for adoption. The Protector's
duty here is similar to the duty of a guardian ad litem'? under
s 13(1) of the Adoption Act. The guardian ad litem is
responsible to investigate as fully as possible all the
circumstances of the child and the applicant, and all other
matters relevant to the proposed adoption, in order to safeguard
the interests of the child before the court.
3. Valuable consideration for adoption of child
Section 48(1) of the Child Act provides that anyone who takes
part in any transaction, the object of which is to transfer or
confer, wholly or partly, temporarily or permanently the
possession, custody or control of a child for any valuable
consideration, commits an offence. It is however, a defence
under sub-s (4) if the transfer took place in contemplation of
or pursuant to a bona fide adoption and at least one of the
natural parents or the guardian of the child was a consenting
party to the adoption and had expressly consented. The issue
that arises here is, if the transfer of the child is in contemplation
of or pursuant to a bona fide adoption, is the giving of a
valuable consideration for the adoption permitted?
Section 48(4) is silent on the issue of "valuable consideration"
in the case of a bona fide adoption. It is submitted that if the
transfer is for a bona fide adoption, the party who transfers
the child should not be permitted to receive any valuable
10 A "guardian ad litem" is appointed by a Court under s 12 (1) of the
Adoptions Act once an application for an adoption order is made to the
Court.
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consideration. Reference is made to s 6 of the Adoption Act
in support of this submission. This section provides that before
the court grants an adoption order, one of the factors that it
has to be satisfied is that no payment was made in consideration
of the adoption except such as the court may sanction.
The above issue was raised in Re Sim Thong Lai," The
issue here was whether a red packet containing $200 given by
the petitioners to the natural parents constituted unlawful
consideration. Taylor J stated that the true nature of the payment
must be ascertained because:
The gifts in kind, and even money if it were a merely
nominal sum, may fairly be regarded as tokens or
customary or courtesy gifts but in relation to the
means of these parties, $200 is a substantial amount
and if it were given in consideration of the adoption
without sanction it is unlawful. 32
C. A1aintenance
The Child Act provides strict penalties for parents or guardians or any
person who has the care of a child for failing to maintain the child
properly. Thus, this emphasizes the importance of the duty to maintain
a child.
Chapter 3 of Part V of the Child Act contains the relevant
provisions on maintenance. Section 31(1)(a) provides that a person
having the care of a child would be committing an offence if he, inter
alia. neglects the child in a manner likely to cause him physical or
emotional injury or causes or permits him to be so neglected. Upon
conviction, the person is liable to a fine not exceeding RM20,000 or to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or both.
11 [ 1955] MLJ 25.
1~ lei at p 27.
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Section 31 (4) explains the phrase "neglect a child". A parent
or guardian or other person who is legally liable to maintain a child
who fails to provide adequate food, clothing, medical or dental treatment
lodging or care for the child, is said to have neglected a child. This
clearly explains the situations where the parent or guardian or any
person having the care of the child has neglected to maintain him.
The above provision may be compared to other legislation on
maintenance. For example, reference could be made to s 3(1) and (2)
of the Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950 (hereafter
referred to as "the 1950 Act")_33 Section 3( 1) of the 1950 Act provides
that the court may order any person who neglects or refuses to maintain
his legitimate child to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance
of such a child. One difference that may be noted between these two
provisions is that s 31 of the Child Act clearly explains the meaning
of "neglect a child" whereas s 3(1) of the 1950 Act does not do so.
Apart from s 3(1) of the 1950 Act, s 3(2) clearly states that the parent
has a duty to maintain an illegitimate child of his which is unable to
maintain itself. As to whether the Child Act applies to illegitimate
children as well, reference could be made to the definition of a "child"
in s 2. This section merely defines a "child" as a person below the
age of 18 and in relation to criminal proceedings, a person who has
attained the age of criminal responsibility as prescribed in s 82 of the
Penal Code. It is thus not clear as to whether illegitimate children fall
under the Child Act. It is submitted that since the Child Act was
passed to strengthen the laws pertaining to the care, protection and
rehabilitation of children, it should include illegitimate children too.
A comparison may also be made between s 31 of the Child
Act and s 92 of the LRA. Section 92 of the LRA provides that it is
the duty of a parent to maintain or contribute to the maintenance of
his or her children either by providing them with such accommodation,
11 Act 263.
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food, clothing and education as may be reasonable having regard to his
or her means and station in life or by paying the cost thereof. This
provision could be said to be similar to s 31 (4) of the Child Act as it
states similar situations in which the duty arises.
Apart from the above duty to maintain his child, the Child Act
also imposes penalties on the failure to comply with that duty. Section
31(1) provides that the court may impose a fme not exceeding RM20,000
or imprisonment not exceeding 10 years or both. In addition to this,
sub-s (2) states that the court may order the person convicted to
execute a bond with sureties to be of good behaviour for such period
as the court thinks fit and may include in the bond such conditions as
the court thinks fit. If any of the conditions are not complied with, the
court may impose a further fine not exceeding RM 10,000 or to a
further imprisonment not exceeding 5 years. Section 31(5) further
provides that a person may be convicted of an offence under this
section notwithstanding that suffering or injury to the health of the
child in question or the likelihood of such suffering and injury was
avoided by the action of another person, or the child in question had
died. This shows the seriousness of the offence because although the
suffering or injury was indeed avoided by some other person, the court
can still convict the person having the care of the child of an offence.
According to the 1950 Act, when any person wilfully neglects to
comply with an order made under the Act, the court may either impose
a fine or sentence the person to imprisonment under the Act. 34
However, the LRA does not contain a similar penalty provision. It is
submitted that although the LRA is silent on this matter, it would
amount to a contempt of court if a maintenance order issued by the
court was not complied with.
D. Court For Children
The Child Act has constituted a Court For Children to hear matters
that arise from the provisions of the Act. Section 11 of the Child Act
14 Section 4 of the 1950 Act.
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provides for the jurisdiction of the Court For Children. The question
that arises is in regard to paragraph (b) which states, inter alia, that
this Court may exercise any other jurisdiction conferred on it by any
other written law. As such, the question is whether Parliament would
amend other written laws pertaining to children, in order to confer
jurisdiction on this Court to hear matters which arise from those
legislation as well. It is submitted that this Court should be conferred
jurisdiction to hear all family law matters concerning children, whether
it falls under this Act or any other written law, the reason being that
the environment in this court would be more conducive for a child.
This can be seen in s 12 of the Child Act.
In reading s 12, it is obvious that the drafters have taken extra
care in drafting it. They have taken into account the fact that if
matters concerning children are heard in the same courtroom as adults,
this will have an adverse impact on the child's emotions and psychology.
It is also stipulated that if the Court For Children sits in the same
building as other courts, the entrance and exit to this Court should be
different to enable the children to be brought to and from the Court
separately. As such, a child's privacy is protected through this section.
Further, s 11(2) of the Child Act states that the Court For
Children shall consist of a Magistrate who shall be assisted by two
advisers to be appointed by the Minister from a panel of persons
resident in the State. Sub-section (3) provides that one of the two
advisers shall be a woman. This is perhaps due to the fact that a
female would be in a better position to understand a child's emotions
and feelings. Taking note of these facts, it is reiterated that the Court
For Children should indeed be conferred jurisdiction to hear all family
law cases concerning children. Judges sitting in the Court For Children
could be specialised or more exposed to family matters, especially
concerning child law.
The provisions of the Child Act have in principle strengthened
the laws on the protection of children and in safeguarding their interests.
The Act may also be viewed as supplementing the gaps existing in
other legislation on family law, particularly those which fail to provide
penal provisions whenever there is a default.
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v. Registration of Customary Marriages under the LRA
The preamble to the LRA provides for, inter alia, monogamous
marriages and solemnisation and registration of such marriages and
matters incidental thereto. From the preamble, it could be noted that
registration of marriages is one of the reasons for the enactment of the
LRA. Prior to 1 March 1982 (the date of coming into force of the
LRA), not all marriages had to be registered. This in turn caused
hardship to parties to a marriage, especially a customary marriage,
when it came to the issue of proving that their marriage had taken
place. They had to produce expert evidence, wedding invitations and
photographs to prove that their marriage had taken place.
In the past decade, a particular provision in the LRA, ie s 34,
had caused mischief as it was applied by the courts to validate a
marriage which was not registered. Section 34 reads as follows:
Nothing in this Act or the rules made thereunder shall be construed
to render valid or invalid any marriage which otherwise is invalid or
valid merely by reason of its having been or not having been
registered.
There have been a few cases which discussed this issue. In
1993, the High Court in Tam Ley Chian v Seah Heng Lye35 held that
the marriage solemnised under the Chinese custom in 1986 but not
registered was void. It must, however, be noted that both parties
conceded this point.
Four years later, in Chong Sin Sen v lanaki Chellamuthu'"
the respondent sued the appellant on behalf of her husband who died
in a road crash. Her marriage was not registered but there was a
customary marriage in 1991. The judge ruled that the word "wife" in
1\ [1993] 3 MLJ 696.
16[199715 MLJ 411.
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the Civil Law Act 195637 was not restricted to women whose marriages
were registered.
In 1999, this issue once again arose before the High Court in
Leong Wee Shing v Chai Siew Yin.38 The plaintiff contended that
she married the deceased according to Chinese customary rites. She
tendered as exhibits her wedding invitation card, wedding photographs
of herself and the deceased and photographs taken at the wedding
dinner as proof of her marriage to the deceased. The defendant (the
plaintiffs mother-in-law) contended that the wedding dinner referred
to by the plaintiff would not validate the marriage. The fact that the
marriage was not registered at the registry of marriage proved that
there was no valid marriage between the plaintiff and the deceased.
The defendant relied on s 27 of the LRA which provides as follows:
The marriage of every person ordinarily resident in Malaysia
and of every person resident abroad who is a citizen of or
domiciled in Malaysia after the appointed date shall be
registered pursuant to this Act.
The High Court held that in enacting the LRA, Parliament
would not have intended to nullify all marriages that had occurred
before 1 March 1982 for want of registration as the consequences
would be disastrous. Hence s 34 was introduced to validate such
marriages that were not registered before 1 March 1982. It is submitted
that the learned judge need not have applied s 34 to validate marriages
prior to 1 March 1982 as s 4(2) of the LRA clearly states that such
marriages, if they were valid under the law, religion, custom or usage
under which they were so1emnised, shall be deemed to be registered
under the LRA.
The High Court referred to s 5(4) of the LRA which makes
it mandatory for marriages after 1 March 1982 be solemnised as
17 Act 67.
18 [2000] 5 MLJ 162.
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provided in Part III of the LRA. The learned judge then looked at the
relevant provisions in Part III that applied to the present case, ie ss
22( 1)(c) and 24( 1) concerning solemnisation and s 25 concerning
registration of marriages. However, the learned judge merely looked
at whether the marriage in the present case was properly solemnised
according to s 22(1)(c) and did not examine whether the requirement
in s 25 concerning registration was complied with.
It is respectfully submitted that the learned judge ought to
have examined the wordings in s 25 of the LRA, ie " ... the Registrar
shall enter the prescribed particulars in the marriage register", thereby
making it mandatory on the part of the Registrar to register the marriage
immediately after the solemnisation. On the other hand, his Lordship
merely stated that non-registration in the present case is of no
consequence as s 34 takes care of that and validates the marriage. It
is further submitted that the court ought to have also looked at s 27
of the LRA which makes it mandatory for every citizen, resident or
domiciliary of Malaysia to register their marriage, which takesplace
after 1 March 1982, pursuant to the LRA.
Thus, if the High Court's approach is to be accepted and
followed, it would render ss 25 and 27 otiose. If registration is not
considered important in a marriage which takes place after 1 March
1982, it would defeat one of Parliament's main reasons in enacting the
LRA, ie to register non-Muslim marriages.
The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal" which agreed
and upheld the High Court's decision. The learned judge in the Court
of Appeal stated that if Parliament had intended registration to have
an effect on the validity of a marriage, it should have clearly stated so
in the LRA. To the contrary, Parliament has expressly stated that
non-registration would not affect the validity of a marriage. The appeal
was therefore dismissed.
W Chai Siew Yin v Leong Wee Shing [2004] 1 ell 752.
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Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal in this case
seem to indicate that s 34 does not make registration of customary
marriages compulsory, so long as the marriages are solemnised in
accordance with the requirements in Part III of the LRA. It is
respectfully submitted that both the courts in the present case have
failed to take into consideration that s 2540 is also part of the solemnisation
procedure in Part III. Both courts referred to s 5(4) which states that
all non-Muslim marriages must be solemnised according to Part III of
the LRA. Thus, if the marriage was not registered pursuant to s 25,
the parties could not be said to have complied with Part III.
By holding that s 34 validates unregistered customary marriages,
the courts are taking the law back to the pre-I March 1982 era. As
mentioned earlier, the Court of Appeal held that if Parliament had
intended to nullify a marriage for want of registration, it should have
stated it in very clear language in the LRA. It is respectfully submitted
that the absence of such express terms in the LRA does not mean that
Parliament had no intention of making registration compulsory.
Reference can indeed be made to s 33 of the LRA which
provides for optional registration of marriages solemnised under any
religion or custom before 1 March 1982. In the same way, if Parliament
had intended to make registration optional for marriages solemnised
under any religion or custom after 1 March 1982, it would also have
stated as above. The fact that this was not done so results in the
presumption that Parliament did not intend registration to be optional
for post 1 March 1982 marriages.
40 Section 25 of the LRA provides as follows:
(1) Immediately after the solemnisation under section 23 or 24
is performed, the Registrar shaIl enter the prescribed particulars
in the marriage register.
(2) Such entry shall be attested by the parties to the marriage and
by two witnesses other than the Registrar present at the
solemnisation of the marriage.
(3) Such entry shaIl then be signed by the Registrar solemnising
the marriage.
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Section 31 of the LRA provides that a citizen or domiciliary
of Malaysia who marries abroad, not in the Malaysian Embassy, High
Commission or Consulate, has to register this marriage within six months
after the date of such marriage or if either or both parties return to
Malaysia before the expiry of the six months, register the marriage
within six months of arrival in Malaysia. Section 31 (4) provides that
if the parties fail to register, they would have to pay a penalty. Further
thereto, s 35 provides that omission to appear before the Registrar
within the prescribed time required by s 31 would attract imprisonment
for a term not exceeding one year or to a fine not exceeding RM 100
or to both. Hence, the issue that arises is that if parties who marry
overseas according to custom or religion have to register their marriages,
failing which they will be penalised, why should parties who also marry
according to custom or religion not be imposed a similar penalty if they
fail to register their marriages?
Non-registration of marriages would also cause hardship when
it comes to ancillary matters like maintenance, legitimacy, division of
matrimonial assets, guardianship and custody. Parties intending to
claim any of the above would first have to prove that there was a valid
marriage. If they have not registered their marriage and intend to cite
the ruling in Leong Wee Shing v Chai Siew Yin as an authority to
prove that their marriage was validated by s 34, it would cause hardship
as they would have to produce their wedding invitations, wedding
photographs and may even have to call expert witnesses to prove that
their marriage was solemnised according to custom. This would be
similar to the position prior to the enforcement of the LRA.41
The question that arises next is how s 34 should be interpreted?
The writer agrees with the interpretation given by Mr Balwant Singh
Sidhu in his article Married or Not Married? - That is the Question."
He states that s 34 has two possible irnplications.V
41See the cases of Re Lee Siew Kow (1952] MLJ 184, and Yeap Leong Huat
• v Yeap Leong Soon & Ano,. [1989) 3 MLJ 157.
42 [2002] 3 MLJ cxxix.
4' lei at p cxxxvii,
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MALAYSIAN FAMILY LAW 297
(i) the Act does not render valid any marriage which is otherwise
invalid, merely by reason of its having been registered;
(ii) the Act does not render invalid any marriage which is otherwise
valid, merely by reason of its not having been registered.
He further states that the second implication is the cause of
the mischief, when compared to the first:
It is perfectly correct to say that a marriage may be valid even if it
was not registered under the Act, in certain situations. For example,
if the marriage was solemnised in a foreign jurisdiction in accordance
with the laws of that country (but not solemnised in our embassy
in that country in accordance with s 26 of the Act), and if the parties
fail to register that foreign marriage within 6 months before the nearest
available Registrar overseas under s 31(1) of the Act; or where either
or both parties return to Malaysia within 6 months and fail to register
the marriage here. Such marriages would be recognised as valid, if
valid according to the lex loci celebrationis (the law of the place of
celebration). Their non-registration under the Act would not render
them invalid. Section 34 would come to aid, in the interest of the
comity of nations.
Therefore it is submitted that s 34 should be interpreted to
validate marriages which have been solemnised as mentioned above,
and not be used to approve marriages which are solemnised, but not
registered in Malaysia.
However, when the appellant appealed to the Federal Court
against the Court of Appeal's decision, the Federal Court, consisting
of Federal Court Justices, Pajan Singh Gill and Rahmat Hussain, and
Court of Appeal Justice, Richard Malanjum, unanimously overturned
the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the High Court, ruling that
customary marriages after I March 1982, which were not registered,
were not recognised under the law.
Pajan Singh Gill FCJ said that s 34 of the LRA should be read
in harmony with the other provisions of the LRA, which encapsulates
the overall intention to "provide for monogamous marriages and the
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solemnisation and registration of such marriages". "We are not in
agreement with the reasoning of the judgments both in the High Court
and the Court of Appeal", said Pajan Singh Gill FC] in his oral decision."
Thus, it is submitted that the above Federal Court decision
conforms with the intention of the drafters of the LRA, in that it
recognises that registration of marriages was one of the reasons for
the enactment of the LRA, apart from providing for monogamous
marriages and the solemnisation of such marriages. It is hoped that
the dilemma as to the registration of customary marriages after 1
March 1982 is put to rest by the decision of the apex court as above.
VI. Maintenance of Children above the Age of 18 Years
It is the duty of a parent to maintain or contribute to the maintenance
of his or her children, whether they are in his or her custody or the
custody of any other person, by providing them with such
accommodation, clothing, food and education as may be reasonable.
This is provided for under s 92 of the LRA. However, this duty
generally ceases when the child reaches the age of 18 years, unless
the child is under physical or mental disability. If the child is physically
or mentally disabled, the duty to maintain continues until the disability
ceases. This is the situation under s 95 of the LRA. "Child" is
defined in s 87 of the LRA as meaning a child below the age of 18
years.
Pursuant to the above provisions, it seems that a child who
reaches the age of 18 years without any disability cannot look to his
parents for maintenance thereafter. The law expects him to be able
to fend for himself. The question that arises in this situation is what
about the children above the age of 18 years of age who intend to
pursue their tertiary education, bearing in mind that the cost of tertiary
education is not cheap. The situation is worse for a child from a
broken home. The answer to the above question was given in a
positive manner in the Court of Appeal's decision in Ching Seng
41 Federal Court Civil Appeal No 02-10 0[2003 (W).
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Woah V Lim Shook Lin.4S The court here held that maintenance
should extend to a child's tertiary degree, beyond the age of 18 years.
Mahadev Shankar JeA, in considering the effect of no
maintenance beyond the age of 18 years, stated as follows:"
When parents divorce, the children suffer the most ... Not
only can they not look to their parents thereafter for money
but also by inference for shelter in the matrimonial home!
Section 95 could thus become the bohsias charter.
His Lordship further stated:"
[S]ection 95 ... has to be viewed in the context of a child
who is not simultaneously faced with the break-up of the
family homestead. The parental duties in this context are
spelt out by s 92 and it extends to accommodation, clothing,
food and education as may be reasonable having regard to
his or her means and station in life or by paying the cost
thereof.
[T]he Court's powers under s 5248 are very wide and
transcend the limitations contained in s 95, because s 52
operates in a situation where the family is being legally
disintegrated.
45 [1997] 1 MLJ 109.
46 Id at p 120.
47 Ibid.
48 Section 52 of the LRA provides that if the husband and the wife mutually
agree that their marriage should be dissolved they may after the expiration
of two years from the date of their marriage present a joint petition accordingly
and the court may, if it thinks fit, make a decree of divorce on being satisfied
that both parties freely consent, and that proper provision is made for the
wife and for the support, care and custody of the children, if any, of the
marriage, and may attach such conditions to the decree of divorce as it thinks
fit.
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The learned judge then went on to compare an 18 year-old in
a Western country and Malaysia. He stated that unlike the United
Kingdom and many other European countries, Malaysia is not a welfare
state. Whilst married women's claim to a share of the matrimonial
assets is entrenched in our laws," the rights of dependent young
persons in those assets (the assets of his or her parents) are yet to
receive proper articulation. There is no specific statute providing that
a dependent young person, above the age of 18 years, could claim
financial aid from his or her parents. Therefore his Lordship held that
in appropriate cases, for example where the young person is pursuing
his or her tertiary education, involuntary financial dependence is a
physical disability under s 95 of the LRA.
The above decision was followed by the High Court and the
Court of Appeal in Karunairajah all Rasiah v Punithambigai alp
Ponniah," Pursuant to the dissolution of the petitioner's and
respondent's marriage and a consent order, the respondent made
maintenance payments monthly for all their three children. When their
eldest child reached the age of 18 years, the respondent indicated that
he would cease payment. The consent order however did not stipulate
that the maintenance payments should cease upon the child attaining
the age of 18 years. The petitioner referred to Ching Seng Woah51
and cited s 95 in support of the argument that maintenance of a child
of the marriage would not stop at the age of 18 years but would
continue until the child has obtained a first degree through tertiary
education. This was because involuntary financial dependence was a
physical disability within one of the exceptions to s 95.
49 For example, the Married Women Act 1957 (s II) and the LRA (s 76)
provide that a married woman has a right to claim her share in the matrimonial
property and she could do so by making an application to the court either
during the continuance of her marriage or during a matrimonial proceeding.
50 [2000] 5 CLJ 121 (lIC); L2003] 2 MLJ 529 (CA).
51 Supra n 45.
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In response to the petitioner's argument, the respondent argued
that under s 95 of the LRA, the duty to maintain a child would cease
upon the child attaining the age of 18 years or if the child was under
a physical or mental disability, on the ceasing of such disability,
whichever was later. The respondent referred to the decisions in
Kulasingam v Rasammah'? and Gisela Gertrud Abe v Tan Wee
Kiat53 to support the contention that a maintenance order for a child
cannot be extended beyond the age of 18 years. The respondent
further stated that the decision of the Court of Appeal in Ching Seng
Woah pertaining to involuntary financial dependence was merely obiter
and thus did not bind the High Court.
The High Court" held that the two cases above did not decide
on the issue as to what amounted to physical disability under s 95,
which was the issue for determination by the court in the present case.
The learned judge, Low Hop Bing J then referred to Ching Seng
Woah which was cited by the petitioner and stated that the combined
effect of ss 95, 52 and 92 of the LRA would be that a child of the
marriage should be provided with maintenance for the purpose of
realising the opportunity, right or access to education including tertiary
education even though such education, at least towards obtaining a
first degree, extends beyond the age of 18 years.
Therefore the High Court eventually held that it was fair and
reasonable for the respondent to maintain his children until they obtained
their first degree due to their involuntary financial dependence for
purposes of pursuing and/or completing their tertiary education which
constituted a physical disability under s 95.
The husband appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of
Appeal unanimously dismissed the appeal and upheld the High Court's
decision. His Lordship, Abdul Kadir JCA, went one step further and
said that in addition to falling within the meaning of physical disability,
52 [1981] 2 MLJ 36.
53 [1986] 2 MLJ 58 (He); [1986] 2 MLJ 297 (FC).
54 Supra n 50.
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"involuntary financial dependence" could also be taken to come within
the meaning of mental disability in s 95 of the LRA. This is because
the child of a marriage, pursuing his or her tertiary education, required
both an able body and mind to undergo a tertiary education. Parents
would not want their children to miss this golden opportunity of a
tertiary education to be given to them and indeed would be aspiring for
it.
The learned judge then went on to construe the intention of
the Parliament in incorporating s 95 into the LRA. He stated that
children living together with their parents would definitely not be left
to wander in the street to fend for themselves upon attaining the age
of 18 years. Therefore it could not have been the intention of the
legislator in incorporating the provisions of s 95 into the LRA to make
the children worst off in the event of the break-up of the marriage of
their parents compared to children living together with their parents
under the same roof.
Finally, the Court of Appeal stated that s 95, in a given situation
such as the present case, should be construed in a more liberal fashion
in the light of the duty imposed upon the parent to maintain their child
as embodied in s 92 of the LRA. It is indeed heartening to note that
the above decisions have infused new life into the exception in s 95
in order to safeguard the educational needs of children above the age
of 18 years, especially those from broken homes, who are keen in
pursuing their education.
However, the hopes of the children above the age of 18 years
which were raised by the High Court and the Court of Appeal in
Karunairajab al! Rasiah v Punithambigai alp Ponniah were
shattered by the decision of the Federal Court in the same case. The
Federal Court overruled the High Court and the Court of Appeal's
decision. The Federal Court, inter alia, disagreed that the exception
in s 95, ie "physical or mental disability" should be extended to include
involuntary financial dependence. The court merely gave a literal
interpretation to this phrase.
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It is respectfully submitted that if the phrase "physically or
mentally disabled" in s 95 is given a literal interpretation, the effect on
the children above the age of 18 years would be disastrous. This is
because when the court examines s 95, it should bear in mind that it
may be dealing with children from broken homes where the parents
may be divorced or separated. When the parents are divorced, the
children suffer the most. The courts have held that they should always
consider the welfare of the children as the paramount consideration in
deciding family issues." Although statutes such as the LRA and the
Age of Majority Act 197156 provide that children are those below the
age of 18 years, it is submitted that it cannot be taken for granted that
all children, upon reaching the age of 18 years would be able to fend
for themselves. This is a very critical stage as it is at this stage when
a child, who intends to pursue his or her tertiary education, needs
financial support from his or her parents. The cost of tertiary education
too is not within the means of an 18 year old child.
The Federal Court further stated that it was not the function
of the courts to "legislate as an amendment" to the existing provisions
of s 95 and if the court does so, it would amount to usurping the
function of the Parliament. It is submitted that the decision of the
Court of Appeal in the present case is preferred to that of the Federal
Court on the intention of the legislature. The Court of Appeal held
that the children, whose parents were divorced, should not be penalised
for the break-up of the marriage. They should not be made to sacrifice
their educational talent to pursue their studies at a tertiary level because
the father had refused to make provisions for them to do so, hiding
behind the strict interpretation of s 95. At the same time, the Court
of Appeal qualified its statement that maintenance payments would
cease once the children were able to fend for themselves.
33 See cases including Re Satpal Singh, An Infant [1958] MLJ 283; In re
Thain [1926] Ch 676; Masam v Salina Saropa & Anor [1974] 2 MLJ 59;
Teh Eng Kim v Yew Peng Siong [1977] 1 MLJ 234.
36 Act 21.
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The Federal Court, in conclusion, stated that it was now up to
the Parliament to address this problem and not leave it to the courts.
In other words, the Federal Court was of the view that until Parliament
amends s 95 of the LRA to include provision of maintenance to children
who have reached the age of 18 years to enable them to complete
their degree education, the court would not interfere.
It is submitted that the Federal Court has failed to note the
fact that the LRA was enacted way back in 1976, ie about 30 years
ago, when tertiary education was not as expensive as it is now. As
such, by giving a literal interpretation to the exception in s 95, the court
was applying the cost of living and education in the 1970s to the
present time.
At this juncture it is pertinent to note that even the Government
has policy to encourage parents to support their children's tertiary
education at higher institutions of learning by giving tax deductions.
This is seen in s 48 of the Income Tax Act 1967.57 In the ·2006
Budget, s 48 of the Income Tax Act was amended to enable parents
to claim a tax deduction for their children's tertiary education.
Considering that the expenses incurred for a child's tertiary education
are normally more than RM4,000 per year and to simplify tax-filing
procedures, the Government proposed that an automatic child relief of
RM4,000 be granted for each unmarried child over the age of 18
receiving full time tertiary education at a recognised local institution of
higher learning at diploma level and above. It was also proposed that
the automatic child relieffor tertiary education ofRM4,000 be extended
to each unmarried child receiving full-time instruction at a recognised
institution of higher learning outside Malaysia at degree level and above.
In order to resolve the above problem, it is hoped that one of
the following would take place:
~7 Act 53.
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(i) Parliament should take a positive step to amend s 95 of the
LRA as was done in Singapore following the case of PQR (mw) v
STR.58 Section 95 could perhaps be amended to read as follows:
Except -
(a) where an order for custody or maintenance of a child
is expressed to be for any shorter period; or
(b) where any such order has been rescinded; or
(c) where any order is made in favour of a child
who is under physical or mental disability,
the order for custody or maintenance shall expire on the
attainment by the child of the age of 18 years, but the Court
may, on the application by the child or any other person
extend the order for maintenance to cover such further period
as it thinks reasonable, to enable the child to pursue further
or higher education or training.
The suggestion made above is similar to s 79 of the Islamic
Family Law Act 1984.59 The above amendment would be a great
relief to those non-Muslim children who not only have to bear the
consequences of their parents' divorce but also fend for themselves
once they reach the age of 18 years. Furthermore, it would also be
in accordance with the spirit and intendment of Article 8(1) of the
Federal Constitution, which guarantees that all persons are equal before
the law.
(ii) Alternatively, we would have to wait for another Federal
Court decision in the near future to overrule the Federal Court's decision
and to uphold the High Court and Court of Appeal's decisions ill
Karunairajah all Rasiah v Punithambigai alp Ponniah,
It is hoped that one of the above two matters would take place
as soon as possible in the interest of youths of today who are the
leaders of tomorrow.
58 [1993] I SLR 574.
59 Act 303.
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VII. Conclusion
As has been discussed above, the past decade has seen many
developments in Malaysian family law. While a certain extent of such
developments may be regarded as a step forward, there have also
been some steps backward. It is hoped that such retrogressive
movements will be addressed by the courts or perhaps by legislation
in the near future, so as to enable Malaysian family law to advance
and develop further in providing more protection and benefits for those
who fall within the sphere of family law.

